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Risk and Ritual: the protection of British Pakistani women in 




Abstract  With increasing numbers of Pakistani nationals entering Britain as the spouses of 
British Pakistanis, concern has been voiced over the risks faced by British Pakistani women 
entering into such marriages. This article takes the issue of risk as a central explanatory 
factor in examining the effects of transnationalism on Pakistani marriage ceremonies. The 
involvement of marriages in multiple legal systems, together with the individual 
circumstances of geographically divided kingroups, may lead to additions or adaptations to 
wedding practices. The focus on risk, however, illuminates a novel strategy employed by 
some British Pakistani families to reduce the risks to young women marrying Pakistani 
nationals: the delaying of the couple’s cohabitation until after the husband’s successful 
migration. The challenge for state intervention in the regulation of risks to its citizens 
through immigration policy is to keep pace with these changing phenomena.  




In recent years, the number of British Pakistanis marrying Pakistani nationals has increased, 
and the majority of British Pakistanis now probably marry transnationally in this way. For 
many Pakistanis, marriage is one of very few routes for migration to the UK still possible 
under the current immigration regulations (Shaw 2001).
1
 Until the last few years, most 
marriage migrants from Pakistan were female. 1997, however, saw the abolition of the 
Primary Purpose Rule, which had required spouses to prove that their principal motivation for 
entering into the marriage was not to gain entry to Britain, and which had been seen as 
targeted at reducing South Asian immigration (Menski 1999). As a consequence of this 
change in regulations, the numbers of men entering Britain on spousal visas have increased. 
At first this was largely as a result of re-applications from those previously rejected (Home 
Office 2001), but this rise has been sustained. Women for whom marriages are arranged with 
Pakistani nationals are thought by both commentators and my informants to be vulnerable to 
two types of risk: that the visa application will be rejected, leaving the bride as an 
‘immigration widow’ (Menski 2002); or that the marriage will be deemed, in the terminology 
used by the recent White Paper on immigration, ‘bogus’ (Home Office 2002). ‘Bogus’ 
marriages are ‘ones in which men from South Asia trick local [British] Asian families into 
allowing them to marry their daughters, only to divorce them immediately they acquire 
British citizenship so that they can bring their real wives and children to Britain’ (Werbner 
2002: 3).
2
 This article argues that one response to these risks can be found in changing 
marriage practices that allow the couple’s cohabitation to be delayed until after migration.  
The recent, largely sociological, literature on risk grew out of concerns over the dangers to 
human health and the environment presented by new technologies (Krimsley & Golding 
1992), and risk has been treated by some theorists as a distinctive feature of late modernity 
(Beck 1992; Giddens 1991). Whilst the topic has most often been dealt with at this macro-
level, anthropological understandings of risk may be more useful in understanding the small-
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scale, often ‘interpersonal’ (Lupton 1999: 14) calculation and management of risk involved in 
transnational marriage. Fundamental to the anthropological contribution to this field is the 
need to situate risks in their socio-cultural environment (Caplan 2002, Douglas & Wildavsky 
1983; Douglas 1992).  
The current article draws on ethnographic research carried out with people of predominantly 
Punjabi background, in both the Pakistani Punjab and in the English city of Bristol. The 
fieldwork involved eighteen months of participant-observation with families and community 
groups, and at wedding celebrations, together with just over thirty semi-structured interviews 
conducted in Bristol with participants in this type of marriage. As is common among South 
Asian Muslims, the majority of these marriages were between first or second cousins, or 
more distant relatives. Although most academic discussions of such marriage arrangements 
have emphasised the strategic motivations for the families involved – as a means to continue 
the migration of kin, to fulfill obligations to relatives, or to demonstrate kin group solidarity 
(Ballard 1987; Shaw 2000: 147-58; Shaw 2001) – this research revealed the role of risk in 
helping to shape marital choices.  
For Pakistanis, arranging a marriage is understood to be a risky process, with the dangers that 
potential spouses’ flaws may be concealed, proposals may be rejected, or daughters 
mistreated. As noted above, transnational marriage serves to introduce new risks for the 
British brides. Migrants might be though of as positively disposed towards taking risk (cf. 
Gardner 1995: 262-3), but transnational marriage can also be seen as a way of avoiding the 
perceived dangers of selecting a spouse raised in the West. Several informants suggested that 
the ‘British-born’ may be more likely to neglect religious knowledge or practice, to indulge in 
‘immoral’ activities, or to exhibit a lack of commitment to marriage and the family - in 
contrast to the more traditional, religious, hardworking or family-oriented spouse that they 
hoped might be obtained in Pakistan (c.f Constable 1995 on such ‘gendered imaginings’ in 
transnational ‘marriage-scapes’). Elsewhere I have suggested that the current popularity of 
marriage between trusted close relatives is at least in part a reaction to the various risks 
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involved in selecting suitable spouses, as well as helping to strengthen connections between 
kin divided by migration (Charsley 2003; 2005a).3 Here, I argue that wedding rituals, already 
somewhat flexible, and sometimes multiplied or adapted in response to legal aspects of the 
transnational context, may also be modified in and attempt to protect the conceptually 
vulnerable British women marrying Pakistani men. 
Pakistani Weddings 
I start with an idealised portrayal of a ‘typical’ Pakistani-Punjabi wedding. Marriage customs 
vary (see Charsley 2003), but this outline of some common features of weddings in which 
both spouses are resident in Pakistan will form a backdrop to the developments presented in 
the remainder of the paper. Pakistani weddings tend to be lengthy affairs consisting of a 
variety of events spread over several days. These most commonly include three main 
festivities held on separate (conventionally subsequent) days: the pre-wedding menhdi, the 
barat (feting of the groom’s party), and the walima celebration given by the groom’s family.  
Mendhi translates literally as henna, used to decorate the bride’s hands and feet in preparation 
for her marriage, but is also the name for the most popular of the pre-wedding festivities. 
More than the other days of a wedding, the menhdi is eagerly anticipated as an occasion for 
women to gather, play the dholki (a small drum), dance and sing. Women from the other 
‘side’ (i.e. the groom or bride’s relatives, although in close kin marriage this division can be 
somewhat artificial for some mutual relatives) come to the celebration bringing decorated 
trays of menhdi, and the singing and dancing can become quite competitive, with songs that 
ridicule the groom and his family, and the bride and groom’s sisters striving to perform the 
best dances. The bride takes no part in the festivities, but sits with her head modestly covered 
and bowed, whilst guests hand-feed her sweets and place money and small lumps of henna 
and gifts of money on her outstretched palm.  
On the barat day, the groom’s party (barat) arrives at the bride’s home or wedding hall. If the 
nikah-namah (the Islamic marriage contract) has not already been signed, the bride and 
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groom will sign it separately, before being seated together as man and wife for the first time. 
The bride is elaborately dressed and wears the gold jewellery given to her by both her natal 
family and new in-laws. Both families and guests wear their finest clothes. After the giving of 
more gifts of money, and much photography, a meal is normally served.  Legislation 
designed to curb expenditure on weddings has banned the serving of food at marriages in 
Pakistan, but this is widely ignored. The final ritual of the barat day is the rukhsati leave-
taking, a conventionally tearful moment when the bride leaves her natal family to go with her 
husband to her new home. The following day, it is the groom’s family’s turn to host a 
function, the walima, to celebrate the arrival of the bride in her husband’s household. This 
time the bride’s relatives arrive to greet the newly married woman, and are also served a 
meal.  
As an alternative to this format, the nika-namah is sometimes signed on a separate occasion, 
often known simply as the nikah, which may be days, weeks, or even years prior to the barat. 
Such variations are discussed in greater detail below, but are mentioned here in order to 
illustrate the potential flexibility in Pakistani marriage ceremonies, which lies at the core of 
their potential for adaptation in the transnational context. In the sections which follow, I shall 
argue that the impact of transnationalism on marriage practices is two-fold: marriages 
become involved in the legal systems of two countries and may be adapted to fit the 
constraints and opportunities presented by this type of legal pluralism; and the potential 
flexibility of wedding rituals is exploited and expanded in innovative ways to manage the 
risks engendered by the introduction of international migration into the negotiations of 
marriage.  
The transnational legal context and the multiplication of marriage rituals 
When the nikah-namah is signed in Pakistan, it is recognised as a legal marriage by the 
British immigration system, but when carried out in Britain the nikah alone does not fulfil 
British marriage requirements.
4
 So if a couple marry in England, they will usually have a civil 
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ceremony so that their marriage is legally registered in the UK.
5
 Yilmaz has recently drawn 
attention to the existence of this variety of legal pluralism for Muslims in England, where in 
particular, marriage, divorce and polygamy are dealt with very differently by Muslim and 
English law.
6
 ‘Muslim law,’ Yilmaz writes, ‘is still superior and dominant over English law 
in the Muslim mind and in the eyes of the Muslim community; and many Muslim individuals 
follow Muslim law by employing several strategies in England’ (2002: 343).  
This is an example of what has been called ‘new’ rather than ‘classic’ legal pluralism (Merry 
1988). Whereas ‘classic’ legal pluralism refers to  colonial and post-colonial contexts in 
which foreign law was superimposed on pre-existing indigenous practices, the ‘new’ legal 
pluralism ‘pertains to the existence of plural normative orders within modern, western 
societies in particular’ (Fuller 1994: 10). Transnational processes, writes Merry, ‘shape local 
legal situation in a variety of ways’: 
Colonialism pulled entire legal systems across national borders and imposed 
them on very different sociocultural systems. Pockets of formerly autonomous 
indigenous peoples have become incorporated within nation-states as a result of 
European expansion… The processes of nation-state formation have produced 
multi-ethnic societies in which local groups struggle to maintain autonomous 
legal systems while national interests endeavour to unify and standardise these 
diverse systems. Some nations have voluntarily imported entire law codes of 
legal procedures from other nations and applied them to culturally different 
communities. Innovations in policing, judging, punishing and settling disputes 
have been borrowed among postcolonial nations and former colonizers. 
International institutions and regulations exercise an increasingly important 
influence over local legal orders. (1992: 357-8)  
Transnational migration, however, produces a further type of legal pluralism, as marriages 
become involved in the legal institutions of two countries. Islam permits polygyny, for 
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example, with a man allowed to have up to four wives.
7
 In Pakistan, second marriages require 
court permission, taking the views of the existing wife into account. However, marriages that 
occur without this permission are still considered legally valid (Yamani 1998: 156), providing 
a loop-hole that allows men to remarry without their first wife’s consent or even knowledge. 
During fieldwork I encountered several examples of polygyny in the older generations, where 
it seems to have been not uncommon practice for an immigrant man to have one wife in 
Britain, and another in Pakistan.
8
 British immigration regulations permit only one wife to be 
resident in the country, so one young woman I met in Pakistan finally obtained her visa to 
come to the UK after ten years of marriage, as her husband did not apply for her to join him 
until his first marriage ended in divorce. Even within Britain, however, the duality of Muslim 
and English law can be manipulated to allow a man to have more than one wife resident in 
the UK: in rare instances, a man has married one woman by nikah only in Britain, and 
another either in a British civil marriage, or in a Pakistan ceremony later recognised by UK 
immigration (cf. Shaw 1988: 57; Yilmaz 2002).  
The concept of legal pluralism has been criticised on the grounds that ‘it merely reminds us 
that from the legal perspective (as from any other) isolated, homogenous societies do not 
actually exist’; and that it risks blinkering the researcher, ‘reproducing law-centred 
misconstructions’ (Fuller 2002: 10). In the British Pakistani context, it is true that such a 
perspective tends to privilege these religious and legal marriages over the ‘common-law’ 
unions that some Pakistanis form, particularly with non-Pakistani and non-Muslim partners. 
Nevertheless, such a privileging is common amongst British Pakistanis themselves – 
marriages not solemnised by nikah may not be recognised by the community in Bristol and 
are often subject to disapproval. For the purposes of this discussion, the concept is also useful 
in that it draws attention to the issue of legislation, a matter of crucial importance in the 
negotiation of immigration, and one that will be revisited in the closing discussion. 
The dual legal system can be employed to circumvent the problems of the immigration 
system in another way. Current Home Office regulations allow for a transfer of visa category 
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from study or visit to spousal settlement – so that students or visitors who marry UK 
nationals may be granted the right to remain in Britain without the need to return to their 
country of origin and apply for a spousal visa. The recent White Paper on immigration 
proposed disallowing such ‘swapping’ (Home Office 2002), but at the time of writing, no 
such changes have yet been made. So Rasham from Bristol, for example, who is now in her 
thirties with teenaged children, married her husband while he was in Britain as a visitor. They 
had two weddings – a quick registry office marriage before his visa expired, allowing him to 
stay in the country, and the ‘proper’ Pakistani wedding a few months later.  
In another case, Uzma’s family had been advised that the simplest and quickest route to 
secure their daughter’s fiance’s immigration status was to hold a civil marriage while he was 
studying in Britain. Early on in the year of Nadir’s study in Bristol, their grandfather visited 
from Pakistan, and Uzma’s mother decided this would be the perfect time to hold the official 
engagement party – partly inspired by the excitement of attending another family wedding. 
During another visit by the grandfather (this time visiting a seriously ill relative), the family 
considered staging the nikah while he was there to enjoy it. These plans were shelved, 
however, when a friend of the family died, making festivities inappropriate. They decided to 
stick to the earlier plans of having a joint nikah and civil ceremony, with a large function for 
their relatives in England. The couple’s marriage would finally be completed, and the couple 
would cohabit for the first time, in a full three-day affair in Pakistan to celebrate in style with 
Nadir’s family and other relatives there. In the event, however, the illness of another family 
member prevented travel, and the rukhsati and walima were held in Bristol, six months after 
the nikah and civil marriage. A few months later, when Uzma and Nadir visited Pakistan to 
attend Nadir’s sister’s wedding, they planned to hold a party to celebrate the union with 
relatives in Pakistan, although the wedding was theoretically complete as the walima had 
taken place in Bristol.  
This example demonstrates the many interacting factors – cultural, geographical, legal, 
political, financial and emotional – that can result in the multiplication of the ceremonies of 
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marrying. The opportunities and requirements of the pluralistic legal situation form only a 
part of this complex picture. The transnational character of these families means that visits 
can be such rare occasions that important life events that cause a gathering of kin may be 
scheduled to coincide with them. The ability to hold the religious marriage as a separate 
function increases such possibilities. Legal pluralism creates another opportunity for division 
because a separate civil ceremony can be held, and current immigration policies provide an 
incentive for such ‘paper’ marriages. Finally, a wedding in Pakistan presents opportunities to 
celebrate in much greater style than would be possible in Britain, given the favourable 
exchange rate and the availability of wedding venues, goods and services. It is also a chance 
for parents who migrated to the UK several decades ago, to mark this important life event – 
the marriage of their child – with the siblings and other relatives they left behind. Where the 
main events of the marriage are held in Pakistan, a function may also take place in Britain to 
celebrate the arrival of the bride or groom with friends and family here.  
The divisible wedding 
The addition of the British civil ceremony represents a multiplication of the rites of marrying, 
whilst holding a separate nikah is a dividing-up of the conventional Pakistani wedding 
celebration. Over the course of the research, it became apparent that the normal way in which 
Pakistani marriages are described, as consisting of the menhdi, barat and walima  – which 
may be reflected in the titles of three different cards within a wedding invitation – did not 
really reflect the most important elements of marrying. Some rituals that occur during these 
days came to appear more essential than others, and some were occasionally dispensed with 
all together.  
Some do not hold a menhdi as they consider singing and dancing un-Islamic. The walima, on 
the other hand, is a religiously-prescribed event. Nevertheless, I have come across occasional 
cases where no walima was held. The barat day is in any case generally the most extravagant, 
in keeping with the general pattern across much of North India and Pakistan for the woman’s 
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side to spend more on a marriage. Nabila, however, was sent off from Pakistan as a fiancée, 
and had a simple nikah ceremony at her husband’s home in Bristol, so missing out on the 
barat altogether. Photographs from the family celebration in Pakistan, nevertheless show the 
conventional rukhsati leave-taking scene being enacted, although there was no husband 
waiting in a car to take her away. 
It seems that the two elements of the wedding that always occur are the nikah and the 
rukhsati. It is of course hardly surprising that the nikah is indispensable, as without this the 
marriage would not be recognised as legitimate by members of the religious community. 
Rukhsati, meanwhile, refers to the final ritual of the wedding day when the bride is sent off to 
her new home, accompanied by lamentation and weeping by her female relatives. It is also 
understood, however, to have the more general meaning of leaving the parental home to 
cohabit with the husband, and implies the consummation of the marriage. As such it is an 
equally inevitable element of being wed – where the nikah is the contract which establishes 
the union as legitimate, rukhsati is the practical act of marriage that transforms the virgin 
bride into a wife.
9
 This double meaning of the term rukhsati was reflected in occasional 
confusion in talking about the issue. Jamilah for example, said there was no rukhsati at her 
wedding, while her husband said there was. She explained: 
This is what happened. We went home together and we had dinner… And then 
he went to his house [and] I went to mine. So it was like a rukhsati, but not a 
complete… We went home together, but we did not actually, if you know what I 
mean. And then I went home. He stayed for about a week… not even a week  – 
couple of days... We arranged for him to stay at a family member’s house. 
In this case it seems that the dual meanings of rukhsati have been reified by temporal 
separation – the ceremony of leave taking and joining the husband was performed, but the 
consummation of the marriage took place at a later date. Although the sequence of the 
marriage ceremonies is somewhat different, this can be compared to Nabila’s case in which 
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the rukhsati conventions were enacted when she left her parents in Pakistan, but the couple 
did not cohabit until after her nikah in Bristol. 
The nikah and rukhsati can thus be separated and held on different occasions, sometimes with 
many months or years intervening. The reasons for doing so are diverse, as we shall see, but 
for current purposes, the phenomenon can be separated into two categories: the ‘separate 
nikah’ and the ‘delayed rukhsati’. In the former case, a smaller function is held for the nikah 
some time before the marriage celebration proper. In the latter, the normal wedding is held, 
with the arrival of the barat and the signing of the nikah, but the ‘complete’ rukhsati, in 
Jamilah’s terms, does not take place. The bride may, like Jamilah, initially depart with the 
groom, or the conventional rukhsati scene may be staged for the cameras, but the bride will 
not accompany the groom to spend the night with him and consummate the marriage.  
The separate nikah 
This practice of holding the nikah several months or even years before the rest of the wedding 
exists in Pakistan as well as amongst Pakistanis in Britain – one woman in Pakistan went so 
far as to say that the nikah was really a ‘strong engagement’ – the couple weren’t really 
married yet, but it would be unusual for the match to be dissolved once the nikah-nama had 
been signed. Others would object to the term ‘engagement’ as it undermines the importance 
of the nikah as the religious marriage. Women in Bristol provided a variety of reasons why 
the nikah might be held separately. If the families were not well known to each other, this 
time might allow them to make sure that the rishta (match/proposal) was indeed suitable.10 
Families might want to finalise the match before the couple were ready to marry – they might 
still be studying, the groom might wish to establish his career, or the families might need time 
to save for the wedding. In addition, one woman told me, families might push for an early 
nikah if they feared that the groom might change his mind later on. In one case, a young 
woman who had to return to her job in Bristol simply didn’t have time for the full wedding.
11
 
The holding of Uzma’s nikah as a social event for the benefit of a visiting relative was an 
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echo of the nikah of her aunt two decades earlier in Pakistan during the visit of an uncle from 
Britain.  
As a religious marriage, the nikah also has a legitimating effect. As such, an early nikah can 
permit behaviour that might otherwise provoke disapproval. If a couple are already 
religiously wed, for example, they may sit side by side at a joint menhdi celebration, and 
Sonam’s nikah to her British cousin was carried out so that scandal would not result when she 
travelled abroad to study with another, theoretically marriageable, male relative. In Bristol, 
one couple took advantage of the freedom provided by this state of being religiously but not 
practically married by going out unchaperoned on shopping trips to buy jewellery during the 
year in which they were ‘nikah-ed’ but not living together, overcoming the traditional 
prohibition on contact between engaged couples.  There was another reason that this couple 
had their wedding so long after their nikah, however, and here we return to the issue of legal 
pluralism raised above. They could not have their civil marriage, or publicly celebrate their 
union, until the groom’s divorce from his first wife had been finalised, so they chose to 
solemnise their relationship initially through the religious marriage contract.  
A separate nikah may therefore be held for a number of reasons: to secure the rishta, as an 
excuse for a celebration that gathers kin together, to circumvent the British legal or 
immigration systems, to legitimate behaviour, or to buy time.  
The delayed rukhsati 
While the separate nikah seems to be an accepted tradition in Pakistan, this research 
uncovered a remarkable number of transnational marriages in which the rukhsati was 
delayed, so that the marriage would remain unconsummated until the Pakistani spouse arrived 
in Britain. I did not hear of this situation in Pakistan when international migration was not 
involved. Moreover, among those I interviewed, this arrangement was more common where a 
British bride was marrying a Pakistani groom, than vice versa.  
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Where motivations for holding the nikah separately show wide variation, those for delaying 
rukhsati were remarkably consistent, centring round a desire to protect against future 
difficulties and distress. The stories of two sisters, Nasreen and Rubina, help to cast light on 
why delaying the rukhsati may be attractive to the families of British Pakistani women. 
Nasreen and Rubina did not have their rukhsatis when they were married in Pakistan. 
Rubina: Basically my parents – they’ve seen it a lot that people go to Pakistan, 
they have the wedding – full, full wedding – they have a wedding night together 
and everything, the bride gets pregnant and the husband doesn’t get a visa. So 
she’s here and she’s a single parent and everything. So my parents wanted to 
avoid all of that. 
Nasreen: The rukhsati means, obviously, spending the night together. 
Everybody was worried – like we don’t really want babies and things involved if 
we’re trying to get you over [i.e. during the visa application process]. And we 
knew it was going to be complicated for me because… I wasn’t working… Me 
and my mum and dad all sort of thought that it was a better thing to do. I don’t 
know really – I guess if you become heavily physically involved with someone, 
it’s not necessarily the right thing to do I suppose – to not see them for months 
and months in that same situation. Maybe it’s not mentally healthy or something.  
Although acceptance rates for spousal visa applications have risen, I have indeed heard of 
cases of ‘immigration widows’ whose husbands’ visa applications were refused, but who 
have conceived children on visits to Pakistan. The risk of rejection may help to explain why 
rukhsati is more often delayed for British women. Not only is the risk run by women higher 
than that for men – as the plight of an effectively single mother is unenviable – but there is 
considered to be a greater risk of husbands being refused visas than for wives, as men are 
under greater suspicion of being motivated by economic migration.  
 14 
Moreover, as Nasreen suggests, prolonged separation due to immigration procedures might 
be difficult after embarking on a physical relationship. Pakistanis believe sexuality to be a 
powerful force – a common justification for purdah practices is that an unrelated man and 
woman left alone together would be unable to resist each other. Whilst this temptation 
towards illicit sex is seen as wicked, regular sex within marriage is considered healthy, and 
the separation of husband and wife thought difficult for both (cf. Das 1994).  
The two young womens’ cousin is Jamilah, quoted earlier talking about her delayed rukhsati. 
She added another matter in which her father sought to protect her: 
...because my father had doubts in his mind that what if he never got to England, 
the visa was rejected, and then he still wanted me to be ‘pure’. I’m the only 
daughter you see, so my dad’s very protective of me. 
If a husband’s application to enter Britain is rejected, not only will the fact that the marriage 
is unconsummated protect against the dangers of children born without a resident father, and 
emotional attachments generated and then severed, but the young woman will have remained 
a virgin. As such, not only should it theoretically be simpler for her to obtain a divorce, but it 
may also be easier for her to remarry. Jamilah’s father is thus reducing that which the family 
stands to lose in the risks of transnational marriage and negotiating the immigration system.  
Of course, parents in Pakistan may also have similar concerns for their daughters who are 
marrying British men. As already noted, however, it is considered easier to bring wives from 
Pakistan than husbands. Moreover, it may be that the British side, with its promise of a better 
life, holds greater sway in the negotiations over such matters. When Talib from Bristol 
married Zahida from Pakistan, his mother clearly recognised that the consummation of the 
marriage might cause her new daughter-in-law problems, but avoided shouldering 
responsibility by employing the common discourse of fate: 
Well people do – they don’t consummate the marriage because they have other 
plans... but we said, ‘They’re married and why shouldn’t they? It’s now their 
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destiny how quickly she gets here... It’s their right and why should we get in the 
way?’ 
Fears for British Pakistani women 
Even if a husband’s visa application is successful, there are other fears for British Pakistani 
women marrying men from Pakistan, and for Nasreen and Rubina it seems that delaying the 
rukhsati was also intended to protect against these additional dangers. The family decided to 
bring the young men, who are friends, over one at a time, with Nasreen’s husband first. When 
the marriage failed, and her husband was repatriated within a few weeks of arriving, the 
family decided not risk bringing Rubina’s husband to Britain at all and sought a divorce. 
The assertion that the main reason for separating the nikah and rukhsati – not having a ‘full’ 
wedding as they put it – was to reduce the various risks to Nasreen and Rubina, is supported 
by the contrast with their sister Asma’s wedding. Although the family took care that all three 
functions were identical in all other respects, Asma’s rukhsati took place on the day of her 
marriage. This difference can be explained by the divergent degrees of danger perceived in 
these matches. Asma’s husband is her mother’s sister’s son, a much closer relative than either 
of the other two men. He also has professional qualifications, while the others were poor and 
relatively uneducated. This educated ‘boy’ from a familiar family was far less risky than the 
two lesser-known quantities with clear potential incentives for economic migration. The 
family could thus feel much more confident in allowing Asma’s marriage to be completed by 
cohabitation. 
The Home Office’s concern, formerly expressed in the Primary Purpose Rule, that marriages 
should not be contracted simply for the opportunity for economic migration is shared by 
many young British Pakistani women. For Pakistanis, however, whilst it is by no means the 
only consideration involved, connections to wealth and opportunity are often an accepted and 
intrinsic part of the search for a spouse. Accordingly, young British women may be realistic 
about the economic aspect to their marriages, so when Shareen was deciding whether to 
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marry in Britain or Pakistan, she thought: ‘I may as well give somebody an opportunity from 
there [rather] than somebody that’s already here – d’you know?’  
Nevertheless, the potential or perceived gains from such marriages are such that they may 
undermine confidence in the Pakistani husband’s commitment to the marital relationship. 
Most serious is what the immigration regulations term the intention to ‘live permanently with 
the other as his or her spouse’ – in this case, the husband’s intention to stay with his wife 
once he has gained the right to remain in Britain. A few husbands in Bristol have deserted 
their wives – either having gained ‘permanent right to remain’ after a year, or (and my 
impression is more commonly) having waited until they ‘get their British passport’ (i.e. are 
granted British citizenship) after at least three years. In some cases, once the husband’s 
position in Britain is secure, he has contracted a second marriage in Pakistan.
12
 The 
possibility of being deserted, perhaps with young children to support, while your husband of 
only a few years gains the right to remain in Britain and even imports another wife, 
understandably worries many women. These concerns are intensified when news of such an 
event spreads though the Bristol grapevine. A further fear is that the husband will not be 
sufficiently oriented towards his new commitments in Britain, neglecting duties to his wife 
and children in favour of his relatives in Pakistan. Many women accept that their husbands 
will fulfil their filial duties by sending money to support their parents, but in a few cases 
British families feel that the financial demands are excessive.  
Some men are considered more of a risk than others, and other tactics may be employed to 
reduce these dangers. Several women reported that their husband’s financially stable 
background was a factor in agreeing to the marriage. Not only did they suspect that poorer 
men might be motivated by economic gain, but they often hoped that their household budget 
would be less subject to demands for remittances. Zaynab, whose first husband’s visa was 
refused, was divorced by her second husband once he gained British citizenship. She has 
since rejected proposals that she marry someone in Britain on a visitor’s visa, for fear that he 
might only be looking for a way to stay in the country. Another family brought a man from 
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Pakistan to Britain as a daughter’s fiancé on a trial basis. The marriage did not take place in 
the end, as the family had developed doubts over his character during his stay. In two other 
cases, I met people in Bristol whose future spouses had come over on visits, allowing the 
families concerned to see how they acted in this environment. This option is not, however, 
open to all. Those without financial securities in Pakistan may find it harder to obtain a visa, 
and it is commonly thought that visitor visas are less frequently given to the young and 
unmarried for fear that they will try to evade the normal spousal immigration routes by 
marrying during their stay.  
Mahr: Islam’s protection of women in marriage 
Islam itself makes provisions to protect women against casual divorce and hardship after the 
end of a marriage. In the marriage contract, a sum of money to be paid by the groom to his 
new bride must be specified. This payment, the mahr, should be made before consummation 
of the marriage, but may be deferred or ‘forgiven’ by the bride. At the latest, however, it 
should be paid to the woman if her husband divorces her, and as such has been viewed both 
as a deterrent to divorce and a kind of alimony to support the divorced woman. Informants in 
Bristol generally referred to the payment as haqq mahr, haqq meaning true, just or 
appropriate. 
The local character of mahr is, however, subject to great variation in terms of the amount 
paid and its meanings and consequences (Wakil 1991: 55).
13
 In Pakistan, larger amounts 
correlate with, and indeed confer, higher status, although payment is often deferred. Poor 
families may engage in exchange marriages in which costs including mahr are low (Donnan 
1988: 109, 150; Wakil 1991: 55-6). Small mahr payments are not only, however, driven by 
economic constraints. Prestige may be gained by an agreement on the ‘Prophet’s mahr’ of 32 
rupees, the amount said to have been pledged on the Prophet’s daughter Fatima. Several of 
my informants reported this amount (or one approximating to it), which is in effect a token 
mahr given the current value of the Pakistani rupee, and which they more commonly called 
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shar`i mahr, i.e. the amount prescribed by Islamic law.
14
 In Britain, Shaw reports that small 
symbolic amounts are traditional, and seen by older women as symbols of trust in close kin 
marriage (2000: 243). Moreover, to demand a large mahr is to risk appearing lalchi (greedy). 
In any case, a ‘good wife’ is often expected to excuse the payment of mahr (Shaw 2000: 
243). In this context, to attempt to manage the risks to women in marriage by asking for a 
large mahr could produce other dangers by undermining the presumption of trust between kin 
(cf. Bujra 2000 on risk and trust between kin in a rather different context). 
Islamic feminists argue that the reduction or omission of mahr runs counter to the provisions 
for women’s rights in Islam, and criticise the Pakistani tradition for husbands to ask their 
wives to ‘forgive’ the mahr on their wedding night, perhaps with the incentive of a gift of a 
ring. It is worth noting, however, that even the tiny shar`i mahr may be forgiven – in which 
case a gold ring may make this a very good bargain.  
For several informants in Bristol, mahr seemed so unimportant that they could not remember 
the amount that had been specified, or whether it had been paid. In some cases there was 
confusion about what was mahr and what were other marriage prestations. The munh dikha’i 
custom in which the husband gives his new wife a present to persuade her to let him see her 
face sometimes seems to be confused with the issue of payment or forgiveness of mahr, 
which should be done before the husband first touches his wife (i.e. consummates the 
marriage), unless a deferral was specified in the marriage contract. This confusion seems to 
be most common among young men. Thus when I asked Tahir from Lahore about his mahr, 
he answered: 
Mahr – yes, well the first night... let me remember what I did with it a little bit... 
I had to buy a present for the first night, so what happened [was] that I didn’t 
really have the time – or I didn’t know what I was going to do the first night. 
People told me at the last moment, ‘Oh you have to give a present, you have to 
give the mahr’… My mother told one of my aunts to bring over a present and 
they gave me it as a surprise and said, ‘You give it to your wife’... It was a 
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watch… [Then on reflection:] No – it hasn’t anything to do with the mahr, but I 
paid around 5,000 rupees – but I didn’t know it was mahr at that time until later 
on. My father asked me in the morning, ‘Well, did you pay your mahr?’ I said 
‘Oh right, did I have to pay that as well?’ So next day or a few days after I asked 
her to just forgive it if she wanted to. Otherwise I could have paid it to her. It’s 
not that much… 
His British wife’s memories are also vague, and differ from those of her husband.  
Mahr, yeah… I can’t remember how much it was. But there was a lot of money 
given. Because he gave me a watch on the wedding night, as a present from him. 
And I think it was 10,000 rupees – salami I think it’s called, and he gave me 
that. And the haqq mahr, it was a wee little bit – 35 rupees I think it was. He 
hasn’t given it to me, but I said just give me it whenever, he probably already 
used it on me! Because it’s only a little bit of money, but he said whenever you 
want it just tell me, so I said, ‘Oh when we go next time I’ll just take it then’. 
Saif, from Bristol, seems to have been even less aware of the practice. At first, he could not 
remember the name of the payment, and said that when his wife declared she was keeping ten 
thousand rupees from the wedding gifts as her mahr: 
I wasn’t sure if she was pulling a fast one on me! But I just accepted it anyway. 
She said, ‘Right - this is 10,000 rupees for me, this is my haqq mahr.’ And I 
said, ‘All right then... What’s haqq mahr?’  
It seems that for many Pakistani women, mahr does not seem to provide any kind of marital 
or financial security. This may be because the amount involved is very low, particularly with 
the value placed on the shar`i mahr, which has by now become a token payment, but even a 
large mahr may not be paid if the wife ‘forgives’ it.
15
 Moreover, even if mahr were operating 
effectively in Pakistan, it is unlikely that it could afford any real protection to British 
Pakistani women engaged in transnational marriages to men from Pakistan. Given the 
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exchange rate between sterling and the Pakistani rupee, even the most generous rupee mahr 
would provide neither an effective deterrent to divorce once the husband is earning in Britain, 
nor any kind of adequate financial support to the divorced wife. Given the heightened risks 
that British women and their parents run in arranging transnational marriages, it is hardly 
surprising that other methods of protection, such as those set out in this article, have been 
sought.  
Conclusion: Transnational Kinship, Immigration and Risk Management  
Recent years have seen an increasing interest in transnational social relations, or 
‘transnationalism from below’ (Smith & Guarnizo 1998). As Robin Cohen writes: 
A world economy is propelled by many social and economic actors, including 
states, international organizations and transnational corporations. These may be 
the sinews binding the ends of the earth together, but the flesh and blood are the 
family, kin, clan and ethnic networks that organise trade and allow the 
unencumbered flow of economic transactions and family migrants. (1997: 175-
6) 
The pursuit of a ‘bottom up’ perspective is often intended as a counter to the ‘top-down’ 
emphasis in the literature on transnationalism and globalisation. Nevertheless, the focus in 
such studies has often been on remittances and economic activity, leaving the ‘transnational 
domestic sphere’ poorly documented (Gardner & Grillo 2002: 179). Recent work on marriage 
migration has helped start to fill this ethnographic gap (e.g. Charsley 2005b; Constable 2005; 
Mand 2002). Marriage migration plays a crucial role in sustaining and transforming 
transnational Pakistani social networks, and the detailed examination of such marriages has 
much to reveal about contemporary migration and transnationalism. The research presented 
here suggests that a focus on risk, understood as embedded in cultural systems, social 
relations, and legal contexts, may be a fruitful avenue in the pursuit of a richer understanding 
of the processes of change and continuity in migration. Conventional Pakistani conceptions of 
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vulnerable brides may be rooted in traditions of virilocal residence that do not apply in the 
context of contemporary male marriage migration, but the same concerns are seen to re-
emerge on the basis of new hazards.  These underlie novel transformations in wedding 
traditions that fulfil immigration requirements in holding a marriage ceremony, but protect 
women from the dangers of consummating the union before the husband’s immigration status 
is secure.16  
Returning to the literature on risk, Adams (1995) provides a useful framework for 
conceptualising this dynamic process in his observation of the existence of parallel risk 
management strategies: the formal (e.g. governmental) and the informal. Immigration 
regulations governing spousal migration are one example of the state’s formal attempt to 
reduce risks to its citizens by screening out what it considers to be ‘bogus’ marriages.17 
Assessments of risk are dynamic, part of what Douglas and Wildavsky call the ‘dialogue on 
how best to organise social relations… For to organise means to organise some things in and 
other things out’ (1983: 6). From this perspective, the heated debates following the then 
Home Secretary’s implicit advice to British Asians to seek partners from within Britain in 
light of the dangers of ‘bogus’ transnational marriages (Home Office 2002) can be seen as a 
process of negotiation of acceptable risk. The development of informal strategies takes formal 
provisions into account, and attempts to manage marital risk are set against the background of 
current immigration policies and legal definitions of marriage and divorce. Each system 
responds to the other. The abolition of the Primary Purpose Rule has made it far more likely 
that Pakistani husbands will be granted visas to join wives in Britain. In response, the number 
of British Pakistani women marrying men from Pakistan seems to be rising, which in turn has 
heightened other risks. British embassy staff in Pakistan expressed concern that without the 
ability to reject on primary purpose grounds, they may have to grant visas in some cases 
where they suspect the marriage to be ‘bogus’ or forced. Immigration regulations will almost 
certainly continue to be adapted in the future in response to the perception of such risks.  
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These dialogues echo Adams’ observation that the formal sector tends to try to reduce risk, 
while the informal seeks to balance risks and benefits (1995: 4). So when Jamilah summed up 
the range of uncertainties faced by many young women, her account simultaneously 
demanded protection and freedom: 
Your permanent stay shouldn’t be given in one year, it’s too quickly. You’ve got 
to remember these people don’t know each other. First it’s hard enough putting 
people in a house together that already knew each other, but we’ve got two steps 
in one if you know what I mean. So I think it should be five year period at 
least... We’ve had this really bad experience in the family... and it wasn’t fair at 
all. I think it all comes down to how easy it is. I know we pester [the authorities] 
to say we want to bring our husbands over, I know it’s our fault as well partly, 
but you should have checks on it again and that the permanent stay be delayed. 
Maybe not delay them coming over, but [make sure] that they are suitable. Half 
the people you’ve got coming here... have got nothing to do with us [i.e. their 
wives] any more. They’ve all left – maybe gone back to Pakistan and married 
someone they really wanted to. It’s all using – lots of it is. I mean I couldn’t say 
it doesn’t happen in the family [i.e. with marriages between kin] because it 
happens everywhere now – it’s very common to be used… but this is fraud. 
You’re using someone to come to England, pretend to get married, pretend to 
have children with them, pretend to love them and then – not even five years 
some of them – after two, three years turn around, go back to Pakistan and get 
married again and leave those people to live on government benefit. You could 
have done that in the first place, why do we have to have them living here and 
paying our taxes towards them?... I don’t think it’s fair… They think it’s going 
to make their homes more financially stable back home. They don’t give 
anything about people here and they say, ‘Oh, you live in a trampy lifestyle and 
I’ll keep sending money back home. Rich them up, make them go upper class or 
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whatever it is they want to do’. And their needs are not even essential any more, 
they’re like, ‘I want a mobile phone’, or a stereo system, ‘So you can’t have 
your dinner tonight’. So it’s not very fair… That’s not us though [she and her 
husband], but it happens... They seem like the best people when you first meet 
them, very kind – you wouldn’t think they could ever do a thing like that. Then 
they do. Very cold-blooded.
18
 
Continuing transnational marriage suggests that for many British Pakistanis, the risks remain 
worth taking. The immigration system plays a contradictory role in these potential dangers as 
both cause and protector: a rejected visa application can cause the failure of a marriage; 
whilst immigration procedures attempt, but inevitably sometimes fails, to eradicate the danger 
that a Pakistani spouse might only be ‘marrying a passport’. The elaboration of the potential 
divisibility of Pakistani marriages in order to delay the consummation of the wedding until 
immigration has been achieved is a clear example of an ‘informal’ response to the state’s 
‘formal’ provisions for risk management. The fact that the marriage may be unconsummated 
does not negate its being considered a valid and subsisting union.
19 It is in this valuable space 
for negotiation within the formal immigration structures, and in a context of legal pluralism, 
that the technique of reducing risks to British women by delaying their rukhsati has been able 
to develop. Wedding practices, far from being a fixed aspect of a reified Pakistani culture, 
should thus be viewed as at least partly the product of social and legal dialogues, and as 
capable of further change and development. The challenge for immigration policy is to keep 
pace with these changes so that the evidence presented by spousal migrants in support of their 
visa applications may be accurately interpreted and fairly assessed, whilst also retaining such 
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Notes 
1. Shaw is, however, careful to point out that this is only one among many motivations for such 
marriages. For a full discussion see Charsley (2003). 
2. See the recent disagreement between Werbner (2002) and Menski (2002) over the relative 
importance of these two risks.  
3. There is evidence to suggest that the rates of consanguinous marriages are higher in 
transnational arrangements than is the case either in the parental generation, or where 
marriages take place between British Pakistanis (Shaw 2001). 
4. Not only are officiants and venues often not registered for marriages, but Islamic marriage 
declarations can be made by the couple in separate rooms, while in English law the bride and 
bridegroom must both be present to recite set vows (Yilmaz 2002: 348). This situation led the 
leader of Britain’s Muslim parliament to warn that women who only have a religious 
ceremony may not realise that their marriage is not legally recognised, and that they thus have 
minimal rights on divorce or widowhood (The Guardian, 24 November 2003; ‘Islamic 
weddings leave women unprotected’.) 
5. Such practices form part of the developments in legal practice among migrant Muslim 
populations in Britain that Menski has termed Angrezi (English) Sharia (Menski 
[unpublished] cited in Bano 1999). 
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6. The mechanisms of divorce are complicated by the situation, and women in Britain who were 
married in Pakistan may find it difficult to obtain a religious divorce from the Pakistani 
authorities (Shah-Kazemi 2001). 
7. The Quran states: ‘Marry the women of your choice, two or three or four. But if you fear that 
you may not be able to deal justly with them, then marry only one.’, a passage which is 
widely interpreted as meaning wives should be treated with complete equality (Yamani 1998: 
156). Whether precise equality is possible in practice, and therefore whether polygamy is 
actually effectively prohibited is a matter of debate.  
8. This type of arrangement featured in the popular recent British film East is East. 
9. Indeed, in the nikah-nama the term for a virgin (kunwari) also means an unmarried woman. It 
must be specified whether the bride is a virgin, divorced or widowed. 
10.  In Sri Lanka it is apparently common among Hindus for the civil marriage formalities to take 
on this function, as the couple is not regarded as married in practice without the religious 
ceremony. If the marriage does not place for some reason then they have to ‘divorce’ in civil 
terms. My thanks to Dr Anthony Good for this apposite comparison.  
11. In Bangladesh, Gardner reports the opposite phenomenon, as the traditional delaying of the 
couple’s cohabitation is relaxed in some circumstances where grooms must quickly return to 
work abroad (1995: 167). 
12. It is often difficult to judge whether this was the husband’s original intention, however, or a 
decision made later as a result of dissatisfaction with their first marriage (Charsley 2005b).  
13. For contrasting practices compare, for example, Moor on Palestine (1991) and Tugby on 
Sumatra (1959). 
14. In North India, Jeffery’s informants report the amount of the shar`i mahr to be 125 silver 
rupees (2001). 
15. Jeffery (2001) describes a similar situation of confusion and scepticism surrounding mahr in 
rural North India. Whilst many of her informants either did not know the amount of their 
mahr, or reported a low figure, not one of them had actually received the money.   
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16. Photographs of the wedding celebrations are commonly part of the evidence of marriage 
presented during the visa application process.  
17. It should be noted, however, that some commentators are sceptical about the government’s 
intentions. Menski, for example, suggests that Home Office discourses of protecting British 
Asian women mask a situation in which ‘the “primary purpose rule” was only formally 
abolished, its restrictive principles are still in place’ (2002: 20). 
18. The probationary period for spousal settlement has now been increased from one to two years. 
19. During the research for this study, an Entry Clearance Officer reported that a lack of rukhsati 
may, however, be considered suspect if the couple are claiming that the marriage was a ‘love’ 
match, and there are no signs of ‘intervening devotion’ (letters etc) since the marriage. This 
interpretation may, however, rest on an artificial polarisation of ‘love’ and ‘arranged’ 
marriages. See Mody (2002) for descriptions of ‘love-cum-arranged’ marriages in which the 
fact that the match arose due to a romantic connection between the couple does not alter the 
‘arrangements’ which may later be made for the couple’s marriage. 
 
References: 
Adams, J. 1995. Risk. London: UCL Press. 
Ballard, R. 1987. ‘The political economy of migration: Pakistan, Britain, and the Middle East’ in Eades, J. (ed.) 
Migrants, Workers, and the Social Order. London: Tavistock, 7-41. 
Bano, S. 1999. ‘Muslim and South Asian Women: Customary Law and Citizenship in Britain’ in Yuval-Davis, N. 
and Werbner, P. (eds) Women, Citizenship and Difference. London: Zed Books. 
Beck, U. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage, 59-84. 
Bujra, J. 2000. Risk and Trust: Unsafe Sex, Gender and AIDS in Tanzania. In Risk Revisited (ed.) P. 
Caplan. London: Pluto Press. 
Caplan, P. 2000. Risk Revisited London: Pluto Press. 
 27 
Charsley, K. 2003. Rishtas: Transnational Pakistani Marriages. (unpublished PhD thesis) University of 
Edinburgh. 
— 2005a. ‘Risk, trust, gender and transnational cousin marriage among British Pakistanis’ Paper presented 
to the British Sociological Association conference, York, 22nd March 2005. 
— 2005b. Unhappy Husbands: Masculinity and Migration in Transnational Pakistani Marriages. Journal of 
the Royal Anthropological Insitute (N.S.) 11: 85-105. 
Cohen, R. 1997. Global Diasporas. London: University College London 
Constable, N (ed) 2005. Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia. Philadelphia: 
Unversity of Pennsylvania Press 
Das, V. 1994. ‘Masks and Faces: An Essay on Punjabi Kinship’ in Uberoi, P. (ed.) Family, Kinship and Marriage 
in India. Dehli: OUP, 199-222. 
Donnan, H. 1988. Marriage among Muslims: Preference and Choice in Northern Pakistan. Delhi: Hindustan 
Publishing Corporation. 
Douglas, M. 1992. Risk and Blame. London: Routledge. 
Douglas, M. and A. Wildavsky. 1983. Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Seclection of Technologial and 
Environmental Dangers. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Gardner, K. 1995. Global Migrants, Local Lives. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
—  & R. Grillo. 2002. Transnational households and ritual: an overview. Global Networks 2 (3): 179-190. 
Giddens, A. 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Home Office. 2001. Control of Immigration: Statistics United Kingdom 2000. UK: The Stationery Office. 
—  2002. Secure Borders, Safe Haven. UK: The Stationery Office. 
Jeffery, P. 2001. ‘A Uniform Customary Code? Marital breakdown and women's economic entitlements in rural 
Bijnor’, Contributions to Indian Sociology 1: 1-32.  
Krimsley, S. & D. Golding (eds) 1992. Social Theories of Risk. Westport: Praeger. 
Lupton, D. 1999. Risk. London: Routledge 
 28 
Mand, K. 2002. Place, gender and power in transnational Sikh marriages. Global Networks 2 (3): 233-248. 
Menski, W. 1999. ‘South Asian Women in Britain, Family Integrity and the Primary Purpose Rule’ in R. Barot, 
Bradley, H. and Fenton, S. (eds) Ethnicity, Gender and Social Change. London: MacMillan. 
—  2002. ‘Letter’, Anthropology Today 18 (3): 20, 81-98.  
Merry, S. E. 1988. ‘Legal pluralism.’ Law and Society Review 22(5): 869-96.). 
—  1992. ‘Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes’ Annual Review of Anthropology 21: 357-79. 
Mody, P. 2002. ‘Love and the Law: Love-Marriage in Dehli’, Modern Asian Studies 36: 223-256. 
Moor, A. 1991. ‘Gender, Property and Power: Mahr and Marriage in a Palestinian Village’, in Davis, K.,  
Leijenaar, M. and Oldersma, J. (eds) The Gender of Power. London: Sage, 111-28. 
Shah-Kazemi, S.N. 2001. Untying the Knot: Muslim Women, Divorce and the Shariah. London: Nuffield 
Foundation. 
Shaw, A. 1988. A Pakistani Community in Britain. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
—  2000. Kinship and Continuity: Pakistani families in Britain. Amsterdam: Harwood.  
—  2001. ‘Kinship, Cultural Preference and Immigration: Consanguineous Marriage among British 
Pakistanis’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (n.s.) 7: 315-334. 
Tugby, D. J. 1959. ‘The Social Function of Mahr in Upper Mandailing, Sumatra’, American Anthropologist 61: 
631-46. 
Wakil, S P. 1991. ‘Marriage and the family in Pakistan’ in Singh Das, M. (ed) The Family in the Muslim World. 
New Dehli: M.D. Publications, 42-76.  
Werbner, P. 2002. ‘Reproducing the Multicultural Nation’, Anthropology Today 18 (2): 3-4. 
Yilmaz, I. 2002. ‘The challenge of post-modern legality and Muslim legal pluralism in England’, Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies 28 (2): 343-54. 
Yamani. M. 1998. ‘Cross Cultural Marriage within Islam: Ideals and Reality’ in Breger, R. and Hill, R. (eds) 
Cross-Cultural Marriage: Identity and Choice. Oxford: Berg, 153-170. 
 
